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Background. On October 17, 2007, a severe weather event collapsed two large tents and several smaller tents causing 23 injuries
requiring evacuation to emergency departments in Tulsa, OK. Methods. This paper is a retrospective analysis of the regional
health system’s response to this event. Data from the Tulsa Fire Department, The Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA),
receiving hospitals and coordinating services were reviewed and analyzed. EMS patient care reports were reviewed and analyzed
using triage designators assigned in the ﬁeld, injury severity scores, and critical mortality. Results. EMT’s and paramedics from
Tulsa Fire Department and EMSA provided care at the scene under uniﬁed incident command. Of the 23 patients transported
by EMS, four were hospitalized, one with critical spinal injury and one with critical head injury. One patient is still in ongoing
rehabilitation. Discussion. Analysis of the 2007 Tulsa Oktoberfest mass casualty incident revealed rapid police/ﬁre/EMS response
despite challenges of operations at dark under severe weather conditions and the need to treat a signiﬁcant number of injured
victims. There were no fatalities. Of the patients transported by EMS, a minority sustained critical injuries, with most sustaining
injuries amenable to discharge after emergency department care.
1.Introduction
On October 17, 2007 a severe weather alert was issued
for Tulsa, Oklahoma, and the surrounding area by the
Tulsa oﬃce of the National Weather Service of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). This
weather alert forecast two separate fronts moving through
the area separated by about 2 hours. Each of these fronts
was forecast to produce thunderstorms and high winds
(Appendix D).
At the time, Tulsa was hosting an annual outdoor
Oktoberfest celebration, considered to be the third largest
in the world. Although the venue had not yet opened to
the general public, corporate sponsors, event organizers, and
volunteers were in attendance for “corporate night.” More
than 7,000 people were present at the festival when the
second storm front arrived, spawning tornadoes and winds
up to 80 miles per hour. These winds collapsed two large
tents and several smaller ones at approximately 1930 hours.
Twenty-three people were transported by EMS to area
hospital emergency departments, with six listed in serious
condition and two listed as critical. The others were reported
in fair condition. In addition to these patients transported by
EMS, others injured at the event were either evaluated and
releasedonsceneorsoughtmedicalcareafterself-extrication
and leaving via personal transportation.
1.1. Location: Tulsa. Situated on the Arkansas River at the
foothills of the Ozark Mountains in northeast Oklahoma,
a region of the state known as “Green Country,” Tulsa is
the second-largest city in the state of Oklahoma and 45th-
largest in the United States. With an estimated population
of 382,872 and approximately 950,000 in the statistical
metropolitan area according to the 2006 census, Tulsa serves
as the governmental seat of Tulsa County, the most densely
populated county in Oklahoma. Located near “Tornado
Alley”, the city frequently experiences severe weather.2 Emergency Medicine International
1.2. Event: Oktoberfest. The Tulsa Oktoberfest is operated
by Oktoberfest, Inc. (a nonproﬁt organization). The proﬁts
from the Oktoberfest are used in Tulsa’s River Parks to create
new playgrounds for the city’s children and to make other
improvements to the parks. The event site is located on the
west bank of the Arkansas River, across the river from all
major hospitals in Tulsa. Although the festival is located
across the river from the major hospitals, there are no access
problems to these hospitals by established routes.
2. Methods
Retrospective data analysis and interviews of investigator-
selected responders at the scene were approved by the
University of Oklahoma Health Science Center Institutional
Review Board (IRB). Interviews were conducted using a
script approved by the IRB (Attachment 1).
EMS patient assessment and care data were obtained
from computerized EMS transportation records. Protected
data was carefully redacted per NSA Report number I333-
015R-2005 guidelines.
Injuryseverityscoreswerecalculatedbytheseniorauthor
(C. E. Stewart) and reviewed by two other authors (J. M.
Goodloe and C. K. Sinuitz). One author was the EMSA
MMRS Director who responded to the incident (K. E. Deal),
and one author was on duty at the hospital that received
the bulk of both walk-in and transported patients (J. M.
Goodloe).
3. Results
The following is a brief description of the events that
occurred at the Oktoberfest site as reported by the various
agencies, hospitals, and individuals that were involved.
3.1. Emergency Medical System Response. The Medical Emer-
gency Response Center (MERC) was notiﬁed by NWS-Tulsa
in a conference call of the impending weather at about 1400
hours. This brieﬁng included the chance of high winds and
severe thunderstorms. NWS forecasters felt that if a warming
trend occurred, these storms could spawn tornadoes. NWS
also mobilized the local SkyWarn amateur radio network of
stormspotters.(Appendix Aisthe1111AMupdatedweather
forecast.)
Following these speciﬁc and accurate warnings given by
NWS, the Metropolitan Medical Response Service (MMRS)
Director at MERC initiated a severe weather protocol that
mobilized all EMS supervisors and administrators, readied
all available ambulances for deployment (including those
with drivable conditions that were in maintenance garages),
and prestocked resupply vehicles with additional equipment,
cervical collars, and trauma supplies. The MMRS Director
cancelled an impending personal leave and staﬀed his
responsevehiclewithanEMTwhowasalsoanamateurradio
operator. These two personnel monitored the SkyWarn
amateur radio frequency for severe weather and tornado
warnings.
The ﬁrst weather front passed at approximately 1600
hours with only minor damages including a motor vehicle
accident on US Route 169. Following the passage of the
storm front, clear skies prevailed. The local warming trend
that NWS had predicted would worsen the oncoming second
front that began to occur.
NWS issued a high wind/severe storm warning at 1858
hoursforTulsaCounty.Atornadowatchwasalreadyineﬀect
for Tulsa County at that time. The second storm front passed
through the southern Tulsa area at approximately 1920
hours, just as darkness fell. This storm was accompanied
by winds in excess of 70mph (on-site estimates ranged as
highas80mph).SkyWarnvolunteersnotedcyclonicrotation
of the storm, though no tornadoes were noted in the Tulsa
area.
Public warnings were limited to radio, television, and
NOAA broadcast storm warnings. Severe storm warning
sirens were not activated based on the city of Tulsa policy
limiting wind-based use of weather sirens to winds of 80
miles per hour or greater. As the storm front hit, Oktoberfest
staﬀ felt that the safest area was under the tents due to
rain and approximately 1/2 inch sized hail accompanying the
storm.
It is unknown whether the Oktoberfest staﬀ had knowl-
edge of the second NWS severe storm warning prior to the
arrival of the storm front. Many of the sponsors were local
television stations and their weather oﬃces did call their staﬀ
on site with the threat. One television station did advise their
staﬀ to try and shut down the event due to the predicted
severity of the storm’s second front.
The second storm front picked up the leading (south-
western) edge of Der Bier Garten tent (labeled number
6 in the Oktoberfest event map) with about 2500 people
under the canvas. Wind pressure raised the tent lifting the
canvas like a parachute. The corner posts held ﬁrm, so
the interior 400 pound tent poles were lifted oﬀ of the
ground. This tent pole destabilization occurred three times,
with injuries occurring each time. During the third wind
gust, one tent pole was entrapped by falling tent fabric
and vertical motion was converted to a horizontal scything
motion. The sweeping tent pole struck multiple victims and
indiscriminately ﬂung equipment and tables about. Collapse
of the Der Bier Garten tent occurred 24 minutes after the
gust front arrived. Simultaneously, a smaller tent, number
3 on the diagram, Die Bierstube, also collapsed. Heavy rain
accompanied the high winds and the sun had set, so the area
was in darkness.
At approximately 19:27 on October 17, 2007, the 911
dispatcher received approximately 30 phone calls within
a 10-minute period. The ﬁrst EMS vehicle on scene was
dispatched for a single patient, and the reporting caller gave
no mention of multiple patients. Although multiple calls
arrived in rapidsuccession,it wasnot until the fourthorﬁfth
phone call that the tent collapse was reported. Subsequent
calls detailed a collapse of tents at the Oktoberfest and
noted that multiple injuries had occurred. The dispatcher
immediately vectored multiple ambulances to the area and
notiﬁed ﬁre and police to respond. The ﬁrst responding EMS
unit arrived within 2 minutes of the ﬁrst call.
The ﬁrst responding ambulance was met by several
hundred people who directed the ambulance in conﬂictingEmergency Medicine International 3
directions.Theambulanceproceededintothecrowdandwas
unable to provide eﬀective care or transportation due to the
crowd. Multiple responders described dozens of individuals
with bleeding head and extremity wounds, walking to cars or
aiding other victims.
The ﬁrst responding supervisor (and EMS unit) was the
EMSA MMRS Director, who responded to the series of 911
calls. He established an incident command site, directed
incoming ambulances to a staging area, and established
liaison between police and EMS. The responding supervisor
intercepted subsequent units and issued ingress instructions.
When the ﬁre department arrived, a uniﬁed incident com-
mand was established.
As noted earlier, the ﬁrst arriving unit was unable to
egress the area due to the crowd. Accordingly, the ﬁrst
incident command direction was for the police to establish
open egress and ingress to the area. This was done within 5
minutes.
Tulsa Fire Department responded with ﬁve units includ-
ing Rescue 4, Ladder 4, Engine 26, Ladder 26, and District
Chief car 641. This response included 15 personnel. The
responding District Chief assumed command of the ﬁre
department personnel at the scene.
The MERC Coordinator started hospital notiﬁcation of
the disaster and updated the hospitals at via EMResource
(a proprietary real-time MCI event notiﬁcation and hospital
capability status website). There were six subsequent MCI
event status updates sent via EMResource to Tulsa area
hospitals during the progression of the mass casualty event.
Initialvictimidentiﬁcationandtriageprovedchallenging
aside from the environmental milieu. EMTs and paramedics
from the Tulsa Fire Department were directed to multiple
clusters of reported victims, often by confusing and con-
tradictory bystander directions. There were at least 3 areas
where bystanders were simultaneously trying to rally EMS
presence.
The MMRS Director was in constant contact with the
Tulsa Area Emergency Management Agency (TAEMA) to
assure continued weather monitoring during the incident
response. A weather satellite review revealed no further
incoming hazardous weather. Relatively early into the event,
he was advised by TAEMA that there was no additional
weather threat expected.
Acentraltriageveriﬁcationandtreatmentareawasestab-
lished in an unaﬀected tent which was carefully evaluated for
structural integrity, arriving EMSA paramedics gathered in
this central area to receive subsequent assignments.
A map of the Oktoberfest event obtained by an on-
site internet query proved to be inaccurate, reﬂecting last
year’s Oktoberfest tent conﬁguration (Figure 1). After noting
that the event maps were not accurate, incident command
established “left,” “right,” and “central” casualty areas in
relation to the treatment and transport sites. These tactical
designators proved helpful in resolving confusing terminol-
ogy for the victim locations. EMSA EMTs remained in the
ambulances to ensure timely mobilization of these vehicles
for patient transport and ongoing ingress/egress clearance.
Subsequent arriving ﬁeld supervisory EMSA paramedics
sequentially staﬀed these positioned ambulances.
All EMS-transported patients were triaged and tagged
accordingly.Thesetriagedpatients weremoved tothecentral
treatment area by Tulsa Fire personnel. For unexplained
reasons, triage tags were removed from three patients at the
juncture of extrication and treatment. Re-identiﬁcation of
these patients rapidly occurred without signiﬁcant clinical
impact upon patient outcome. A total of 23 patients were
ultimately transported by 9 EMSA ambulances. Several
ambulances were able to make multiple transports due to the
proximity of area hospitals to the MCI event site.
3.2. Casualty Transport Destination Distribution. Review of
casualty transport destinations reveals that EMS-transported
patients were equitably transferred and distributed through-
out the Tulsa acute care hospitals (Figure 2). Distribution
of the patients by MERC in coordination with incident
commandandtransport/triageatthescenewasina“farﬁrst”
pattern based on the Israeli model with transportation of
the ﬁrst patients to the furthest hospitals equipped to receive
casualties [1]. Patients were sent into hospitals in a “trauma
rotation,” to ensure reasonably equitable distribution of
transported casualties.
One of the authors (J. M. Goodloe) was the attending
emergency physician at Saint Francis Hospital during this
MCI. Personal observation of this emergency physician
indicated minimal impact on typical emergency department
operations at this hospital. Ancillary and nursing staﬀ
attended to the received casualties without duress.
Four “walking wounded” patients were transported by
a “lift” bus with three paramedics in attendance to the
furthest hospital from the scene (St. Francis South). (These
transports and their calculated injury severity scores are
described in Table 1.)
One critical patient was transported with spinal injuries
and subsequent paraplegia. One seriously ill patient was
transportedwithconcussion,lossofconsciousness,andhead
injury.
A total of 35 walking wounded casualties presented to
local hospitals later that evening. The bulk of these presented
to the largest hospital in Tulsa (Saint Francis Hospital) and
to SouthCrest Hospital which was further away from the
Oktoberfest event than Saint Francis Hospital. (The available
information about these patients is detailed in Table 2).
It was assumed that the walking wounded casualties
would present to the closest hospital (Oklahoma State
University Medical Center). This assumption was found
to be in error with this population. The reasons for this
distribution cannot be conclusively determined but are felt
to be demographically related to the site of the personal
residences of the participants. (On this evening only the
vendors and sponsors were celebrating and the majority of
these would live in the southern part of the city due to
socioeconomic characteristics.)
4. Discussion
Since the events of September 11, 2001, and the more4 Emergency Medicine International
Oktoberfest tent locations
(1) Das kunst zelt
(2) Der kunst markt
(3) Die bierstube
(4) VIP tent
(5) Das sports caf´ e
(6) Der bier garten
(7) Das ess zelt und garten
(8) Der bier keller
(A) Information
(B) First aid
River west
festival park
3
1
1
2
4
B
5
6
A
7
8
9
(9) Das jugendzelt
Arkansas River
Jackson Street
Figure 1
Hillcrest
OSU medical center
Oktoberfest site
St. francis main
Southcrest
St. John’s
St. Francis
south
Figure 2: Legend: red = OSU Medical Center, light blue = Hillcrest
Medical Center, maroon = St. John’s Medical Center, yellow =
St. Francis Hospital (Main) on Yale Avenue, yellow = St. Francis
Hospital (South) at bottom of map, dark blue = Southcrest
Hospital, Green “tack” = site of Oktoberfest celebration.
recent Hurricane Katrina in 2005, signiﬁcant attention has
been focused on mass casualty preparedness and response.
In Oklahoma, severe weather is common with tornadoes
and severe thunderstorms occurring frequently during about
one-fourth of the year.
Convectively generated windstorms occur over broad
temporal and spatial scales as was seen in this event. The
longer-lived, larger-scale, and most intense of these wind-
storms are given the name “derecho.” Individual derechos
have been responsible for up to 8 fatalities, 204 injuries,
and forest blowdowns aﬀecting over 3,000km2 of timber [3].
These losses totaled $500 million. When casualty statistics
and damage estimates from hurricanes and tornadoes are
contrasted with those from derechos, it is obvious that
derechos can be as hazardous as tornadoes and hurricanes
[3]. This windstorm was part of a derecho that aﬀected the
plains states and extended into the Ozarks.
A derecho is associated with a fast-moving band of severe
thunderstorms. Derechos are usually not associated with a
cold front, but a stationary front within a highly buoyant,
warm air mass. A warm weather phenomenon, derechos
occur mostly in summer, especially July (in the northern
hemisphere), but can occur at any time of the year and occur
as frequently at night as in the daylight hours. They occur
commonly only in North America.
Derecho comes from a Spanish word for “straight”. The
word was ﬁrst applied to the storm front in the American
Meteorological Journal in 1888 by Gustavus Hinrichs [4]. He
intendedtocontrastthiswithtornado,whichcomesfromthe
Spanish word “tornar” meaning “to turn”. Derechos come
from a band of thunderstorms that are bow- or spearhead-
shaped and hence are also called a bow echo or spearhead
radar echo.
Multiple instances of tent collapse with fatalities and
severe injuries have been reported in the media as a result
of windstorm, but similar instances have been reported only
twice in the medical literature available for online searching
[5–15]. Tent collapse due to high wind is well known to
the owners of marquee tents. EMS and ﬁre have little
documentation of this as a hazard of severe weather; thus,
public safety preparedness eﬀorts do not commonly include
this hazard.Emergency Medicine International 5
Table 1: Transported Patient Summary. Injury severity code = sum of squares of the AIS grade in each of the three most severely injured
areas as described by Baker et al. [2]. Injury severity score for these transported patients was assigned from description in the transport
records, vital signs, and was veriﬁed by three of the authors.
Facility Age Sex Reported Injury Transport Mode ISS
OSU Medical Center
36 M Head and jaw trauma
(Immobilized) Ambulance 9
50 M Laceration to ﬁnger Ambulance 4
48 M Head trauma—no spinal
immobilization Ambulance 4
Hillcrest Medical Center
23 F Back pain (immobilized) Ambulance 9
25 M Head trauma (immobilized) Ambulance 9
55 M Leg pain Ambulance 4
24 F Closed head injury Ambulance 9
St. Francis Hospital
40 M Head and neck pain—LOC Ambulance 16 + 4 = 20
39 M Head injury (immobilized) Ambulance 9
33 F Shoulder trauma. Head
injury—immobilized Ambulance 4 + 4
32 F H i to nh e a db yt e n tp o l e
(immobilized) Ambulance 9
Southcrest Hospital
29 M Head laceration Ambulance 9
42 F Hip pain, right ankle pain, left
elbow pain A m b u l a n c e 4+4 +1
26 F Back pain Ambulance 9
Saint Francis South Hospital
32 M Facial and eye injuries Transit bus with paramedic 4
57 M Leg injury (abrasion) Transit bus with paramedic 1
1 F Scalp injury Transit bus with paramedic 4
44 M Leg injury Transit bus with paramedic 1
St. John Medical Center
54 F Back pain “Walking wounded” Ambulance
EVAC 4
48 F Back pain (immobilized) Ambulance 9
34 M Head laceration (immobilized) Ambulance 9
54 M Head trauma (immobilized) Ambulance 9
46 F Spinal Trauma
(immobilized—paralyzed) Ambulance 25
Totals A total of 23 patients were identiﬁed as transported to a Tulsa emergency department from the
Oktoberfest tent collapse.
The details presented and described Previously comprise
theCityofTulsa’semergencyservicesresponsetotheuncom-
monconsequenceofacommonnaturalhazardinOklahoma.
EMSA had nine ambulances staﬀed by 21 paramedics and
EMTs and seven supervisors who coordinated triage, trans-
port, and logistics with the Tulsa Fire Department and Tulsa
Police Department.
Although this was a structural collapse, the response
scene at the time of emergency services personnel arrival was
structurally safe. All power lines were rendered safe by the
Oktoberfestmanagementwithinmomentsoftheincident,so
Tulsa Fire Department actions were allocated completely to
patientcarewithoutthecompetingneedsofﬁresuppression,
structural stabilization, or hazard mitigation.
4.1. Role of the Media. The media plays a vital role during
disasters as the chief source of public information [16]. Mass
communication is also critical to public safety to ensure that
appropriate information is passed to the public and panic
is prevented. The media has to be monitored and handled
with care, so information is delivered as precisely as possible
during a disaster. This event was no exception.
During the Oktoberfest tent collapse, the police depart-
ment staged the media across the street from the tent
collapse and the triage areas. This location gave them event
coverage, preserved patient conﬁdentiality, and ensured that
media did not negatively impact clinical operations during
the event. The police department managed the media until
the Public Information Oﬃcer (PIO) for EMSA arrived,
approximately 50 minutes after the initial 911 calls. There
was some diﬃculty with her gaining access to the scene that
further delayed EMSA management of the media response.
Local television, radio, and newspaper agencies were
present on site. Information was given by telephone to some
state and national media outlets, though most used local
aﬃliate reports. Brieﬁngs occurred and individual interviews
were granted on site through 2200 hours; telephone and e-
mailupdateswereprovidedthroughtheovernighthoursand6 Emergency Medicine International
Table 2
Facility Age Gender Reported Injury Outcome
OSU Medical Center
48 M Back and head injury Treated/Released
37 M Back and neck pain Treated/Released
57 M Finger injury Treated/Released
Hillcrest Medical
Center ?? ?? Head laceration Treated/Released
St. Francis Hospital
23 M ??—Oktoberfest mentioned in patient
history Treated/Released
33 F ??—Oktoberfest mentioned in patient
history Treated/Released
41 M ??—Oktoberfest mentioned in patient
history Treated/Released
25 F Hit on head by tent pole Treated/Released
38 M Hit on head by tent pole Treated/Released
29 M Hit on head by tent pole Treated/Released
53 F ??—Oktoberfest mentioned in patient
history Treated/Released
Southcrest Hospital Southcrest Hospital stated that they had 9 presenting patients but would not provide any further information.
Saint Francis South
Hospital 45 M Leg injury Treated/Released
St. John Medical
Center St. John Medical Center stated that they had 4 presenting patients but would not provide any further information.
Totals A total of 25 patients were identiﬁed as self-presenting to a Tulsa emergency department and related to the
Oktoberfest tent collapse.
the following day. Local reports conveyed key messages (such
as, “Citizens should not report to the site”) and positively
portrayed rescue eﬀorts for the two-hour event. The six local
hospitals experienced no problems with the media at their
facilities.Apressbrieﬁngwasgiventhedayfollowingthetent
collapse, and all hospitals, EMSA, Tulsa Fire Department,
and other responders were represented in this brieﬁng.
4.2. After-Action Report. Several important points were
made during after-action discussion. Multiple agency-
speciﬁc debrieﬁngs occurred. A multiagency debrieﬁng was
co-coordinated by the Tulsa Area Emergency Management
Agency and was well attended by all participants. There was
widespread acknowledgement that tent collapse should be a
factored hazard of severe weather. Speciﬁc to this event, the
following items were identiﬁed for further hazard planning
education and operations.
(1) In this crowded nighttime venue, it was diﬃcult for
EMS and ﬁre providers to locate the command post
and patient collection area.
(2) NWS weather warnings should have been distributed
to the event planners.
(a) With the abundant warning of the oncoming
storm, evacuation of the event would have
been relatively easily accomplished in a timely
fashion.
(b) This would have prevented all injuries to the
crowd.
(3) A map of the event area and location of tents
should have been provided to EMS, ﬁre, and police
providers so that orientation of incoming units could
be planned and coordinated.
(a) Although the map in Figure 2 was available
online, there were no copies distributed to
police, ﬁre, or EMS. Indeed, responding super-
visors found a diﬀerent placement of tents
than was depicted on the map which ultimately
proved representative of the 2006 Oktoberfest.
(b) Emergency access and egress lanes should be
planned/provided for ﬁre, police, and EMS
vehicles.
(4) Further training about triage and triage tag use for
multiple casualty responses was requested.
(5) EMS/ﬁre supervisors should be integrated in weather
warnings and have access to weather channels.
(6) The city of Tulsa is considering “special event”
planning for large attendance community events.
Speciﬁc requirements would include hazard(s) iden-
tiﬁcation and emergency service command post,
patient treatment and transport sectors, and staging
point location determinations as well as ingress and
egress routes.Emergency Medicine International 7
Appendices
A.InterviewScript
Tulsa MMRS Oktoberfest Injury Analysis Interview Script
All interviewees must be informed before interview.
(1) All answers are voluntary. You may decline to partic-
ipate. There is no requirement to complete the ques-
tions once started. If you wish that the information
givennotincludedintheﬁnalpaper,youmayrequest
that at any time before the research is published.
(2) Please make responses general to protect the ano-
nymity of responders and civilians.
(3) This is a conﬁdential interview.
(4) No personal information will be recorded.
These questions concern the October 17, 2007, Medical
Response at the Oktoberfest in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
(1) What was your general role during the response?
(2) How were you notiﬁed of the incident?
(3) What do you think were the biggest strengths of the
response?
(4) What are you most impressed by in this response?
(5) What is your opinion of the coordination of agencies
during the response?
( a )H o wc o u l dt h i sb ei m p r o v e d ?
(6) What was the most hazardous problem you encoun-
tered in providing patient care?
(a) How did you deal with it?
(7) How do you think this incident could have been
mitigated (lessened) or prevented?
(8) What were the biggest problems that you encoun-
tered during the incident?
(9) Do you have any ideas that might improve a medical
response to such an incident in the future?
(10) How did your previous training or experience pre-
pare you for this incident?
(11) What actions would you change that happened
during this incident?
(12) What actions really worked during this incident?
(13) How can we improve next time this happens?
(14) Do you have a story that helps illustrate this event?
B. The Weather Report
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE TULSA OK
1111 AM CDT WED OCT 17 2007
.UPDATE.....
SIGNIFICANT SEVERE WEATHER EVENT EXPECT-
ED LATE THIS AFTERNOON AND
EVENING WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR STRONG/
LONG LIVED TORNADOES...
LINE OF THUNDERSTORMS DEVELOPED IN RE-
SPONSE TO A STRONG LOW LEVEL
JET OVER THE CENTRAL PART OF OKLAHOMA...
AND WAS MOVING TO THE
NORTH NORTHEAST THIS MORNING...WITH
STRONG TO SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS
OCCURRING WITHIN THIS LINE. THE MAJORITY
OF THIS ACTIVITY WILL
AFFECT NORTHEAST OKLAHOMA INTO THE
EARLY AFTERNOON...WITH STRONG
WIND AND MARGINALLY SEVERE HAIL POSSIBLE.
THIS LINE WILL LEAVE A
TEMP/DEWPOINT GRADIENT ACROSS NORTH-
EAST OKLAHOMA...WHICH MAY
PROVIDE A FOCUS FOR THE LOCATION/MOVE-
MENT OF STORMS THAT DEVELOP
ALONG THE DRY LINE THIS AFTERNOON. THE
TEMP GRADIENT MAY BE
FURTHER ENHANCED NOW THAT THE CLOUDS
ARE BEGINNING TO THIN ACROSS
EASTERN OKLAHOMA AND NORTHWEST ARKAN-
SAS.
C. TypicalSevereWeather Clausein
Tent Rental Agreement
Weather
Client understands that tents are temporary structures
designed to provide limited protection from weather con-
ditions, primarily sun and rain; however there may be
situations, particularly those involving strong winds and
lightning, in which the tents will not provide protection and
may even be damaged or blown over. Evacuation of tents to
avoid possible injury is recommended when severe weather
threatens the area where the tents are erected. People must
leave the tents and not seek shelter in tents during such
conditions. It is best to evacuate when in doubt. Marquee
Tent oﬀers an on-sight technician during the event for an
additional charge to assist with weather assessment and
equipment maintenance. If client declines those services,
client understands that it is client’s responsibility to be aware
of changing weather conditions and to exercise its best
judgment with regardto the evacuationof tents. client agrees
that in the event of a predicted or actual storm or excessive
winds,MarqueeTentsmaydismantleanyequipmentthathas
been previously installed to ensure safety of all involved.
D. CriticalInformation Dissemination—
Oktoberfest Event,October 17, 2007,
National Weather Service, Tulsa
The wind damage that occurred across Tulsa County,
including Oktoberfest, on the evening of October 17, 2007,8 Emergency Medicine International
was the result of a thunderstorm downburst. The downburst
produced wind gusts of up to around 85 mph across Tulsa
County, which resulted in fairly widespread straight-line
winddamage.Thepeakmeasuredwindgustduringtheevent
was observed at the Tulsa International Airport at around
727 pm, when an instrument measured an 85 mph gust.
Wind gusts that were experienced at Oktoberfest were likely
no more than 85 mph.
As noted in the product issuance timeline hereinafter,
the National Weather Service issued a Tornado Watch that
included Tulsa County at 226 pm, a Severe Thunderstorm
Warning for Tulsa County at 702 pm, and a follow-up Severe
Weather Statement to update the warning for Tulsa County
at 714 pm. Estimated time of the Oktoberfest damage was at
723 pm.
The following information was disseminated from the
NWS Oﬃce in Tulsa on October 17, 2007 preceding the
damage in Tulsa County, which included the Oktoberfest
Event. NWS Tulsa actually began highlighting the possibility
of a signiﬁcant severe weatherevent in its products as early as
Friday, October 12. The following items summarize what was
issued from this oﬃce in the preceding 18 hours.
151 am: Area Forecast Discussion highlighting “signiﬁ-
cant severe weather event late this afternoon and evening”.
335 am: Zone Forecast Product “occasional showers
and thunderstorms today—some thunderstorms may be
severe this afternoon. Rain chance 90 percent. Showers and
thunderstorms likely in the evening—some thunderstorms
may be severe. Rain chance 60 percent.”
345 am: Public Information Statement “review of severe
weathersafetyrules ”priorto“ anoutbr eakofsev er ethunder -
storms across eastern Oklahoma and northwest Arkansas”,
including tornado, lightning, hail, and damaging straight-
line wind.
500 am: Hazardous Weather Outlook “severe weather
outbreak expected by late afternoon and evening with the
possibility of strong tornadoes...large hail and damaging
straight-line winds”.
743 am: Tornado Watch 708 until 4 pin including Tulsa
County and surrounding counties.
924 am: Area Weather Summary “severe weather antici-
pated”.
1028 am: Zone Forecast Product updated to increase
evening rain chance to 70 percent.
1111 am: Area Forecast Discussion “signiﬁcant severe
weather event expected late this afternoon and evening”.
1153am:HazardousWeatherOutlook“signiﬁcantriskof
tornadoes, hail to baseball size and wind gusts to 75mph”.
1200 pm: GoToWebinar brieﬁng for Emergency Man-
agers and state oﬃcials; TAEMA attended the brieﬁng.
1245 pm: telephone brieﬁng for TAEMA, which included
timing of severe weather into Tulsa County that evening,
possibility of tornadoes, hail to tennis ball size, and wind
gusts in excess of 80mph with severe storms.
1248 pm: Area Forecast Discussion “a second round of
strong to severe thunderstorms could move into the forecast
area by 1930z”.
144 pm: Signiﬁcant Weather Alert through 230 including
Tulsa for small hail and 50mph wind gusts.
221 pm: Area Forecast Discussion (mesoscale) increasing
severe weather threat this afternoon; increasing tornado
potential this evening.
222 pm: Signiﬁcant Weather Alert through 3 pm includ-
ing western Tulsa County for small hail and 50mph wind
gusts.
226 pm: Tornado Watch 711 through 10 pm including
western Tulsa County and surrounding counties.
230 pm: Zone Forecast Product updated to include new
tornado watch and to increase rain chance tonight to 80
percent.
241 pm: Area Forecast Discussion (mesoscale) severe
potential increasing with ongoing storms in eastern Okla-
homa and round 3 developing on dry line to the west.
245 pm: Signiﬁcant Weather Alert through 330 pm
includingTulsaCountyforsmallhailand50mphwindgusts.
257 pm: Area Forecast Discussion “parameters continue
to align for a signiﬁcant severe weather outbreak this even-
ing”.
331 pm: Signiﬁcant Weather Alert through 415 pm
including Tulsa County for small hail and wind gusts to
50mph.
346 pm: Severe Thunderstorm Warning through 445 pm
for Tulsa County (penny hail and wind gusts to 60mph).
354 pm: Severe Weather Statement updating warning
(penny hail and wind gusts to 60mph).
401 pm: Area Forecast Discussion (mesoscale) numerous
reports of downed trees in Tulsa and wind gust of 62mph in
west Tulsa; thunderstorms in central OK will move into the
area this evening and signiﬁcant wind damage...very large
hail...and tornadoes are likely.
413 pm: Severe Weather Statement cancelling SVR for
Tulsa County.
415 pm: Local Storm Report noting several high wind
and hail reports for Tulsa County.
633 pm: Severe Thunderstorm Warning though 745 pm
for Creek County (penny size hail and 60mph wind gusts).
634 pm: Short Term Forecast through 745 pm “strong to
s e v e r et h u n d e r s t o r m sw i l lb ea ﬀecting portions of” Osage...
Pawnee.. Washington... Creek... Okfuskee...Tulsa...and
Nowata Counties.
639 pm: Area Forecast Discussion (mesoscale) increasing
severe weather threat with storms moving northeast from
Lincoln County.
702 pm: Severe Thunderstorm Warning through 815 for
Tulsa County (penny size hail and 60mph wind gusts).
708pm:HazardousWeatherOutlookaddressingtornado
potential, golf ball size hail and wind gusts to 80mph
(potential).
713 pm: Severe Weather Statement updating Creek
County warning (penny size hail and wind gusts to 70mph).
714 pm: Severe Weather Statement updating Tulsa
County warning (wind gusts to 70mph).
727 pm: Local Storm Report mentioning thunderstorm
wind damage at Oktoberfest at 723 pm with injuries; penny
hail report 3 miles east of Sapulpa at 719 pm.
731 pm: Severe Weather Statement canceling Creek
County warning.Emergency Medicine International 9
728 pm: Local Storm Report mentioning thunderstom1
wind gust of 63mph at Tulsa International Airport.
737 pm: Severe Weather Statement updating Tulsa
County warning (wind gusts to 70mph).
8 11 pm: Severe Weather Statement expiring Tulsa Coun-
ty warning.
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